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Circumventing Non-Appropriation: Law and
Development of United States Space

Commerce
by NIKHIL D. COOPER*

Introduction
In 2001, Dennis Tito spent six days in the Russian section of the
International Space Station.1 Though he did little else other than listen to
opera records and take pictures of the breathtaking view, 2 Dennis Tito
made history in outer space as the first paying "space-tourist., 3 For many
space law commentators, Tito's trip is just the beginning of an
unprecedented commercial expansion into outer space that is possible, if
not probable, within a generation. Already, within the last seventy years,
modem space-faring nations have achieved feats that would have certainly
seemed unimaginable to our forefathers: Sending and returning people
from orbit and the Moon; viewing pictures and film from the surface of
Mars, and; discovering habitable planets in the distant solar systems of
even more distant galaxies. But to say that space has been explored only as
a scientific venture would be to turn a blind eye to ways nations such as the
United States have fostered the commercial expansion of private companies
into space. Even despite a series of international treaties that deny any
member state the ability to appropriate space, the private commercial space
. J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A.
Rhetoric and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley. A special thanks to the entire
staff of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, with special recognition for the efforts of
Patrick Chesney, Nadim Hegazi, and Sonya Palay. In addition, I must thank Professor Leib for
his encouragement and Professor Paul for his timely advice. Lastly, my heartfelt appreciation to
my family who have always encouraged exploring strange new worlds and seeking out new
civilizations.
1. Steven Freeland, Up, Up and... Back: The Emergence of Space Tourism and Its Impact
on the InternationalLaw of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2005).
2. Id.
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industry is booming and looms large in the future as a substantially
profitable enterprise.4
While the marriage of space and business may have many United
States investors seeing stars, one nagging issue threatens to dampen new
developments in American space commerce: United States treaty
obligations may prohibit its involvement in the developing space commerce
industry. Part I of this Note will outline the basic structure of the United
States treaty obligations and suggest that the international prohibition
against the sovereign appropriation of space may in fact illegitimate and
proscribe United States action in private space commerce ventures. Part II
will examine the present day marriage of government and private industry.
Part III will question the extent to which such an arrangement violates
certain international treaty obligations and how the judiciary might
harmonize the two. Part IV will argue that the robust development of
future space commerce may warrant the complete withdrawal of the United
States from its treaty obligations. Finally, when discussing both of the
solutions in Part III and Part IV, this Note will necessarily be forced to
encounter the constitutional issues raised by treaty interpretation and treaty
withdrawal. Still, with no clear answers, this Note will maintain that either
solution is necessary and vital to the continued exploration and
development of space.
I. The Roots of Space Law
Scientists disagree as to exactly where territorial airspace ends and
extraterritorial outer space begins.5 Regardless, most scholars generally
demarcate 100 to 110 kilometers above Earth sea level as the starting point
of space. 6 For the space craft's occupants, hurtling past this boundary
would signal numerous physical shifts, including, most famously,
becoming weightless. However, less obvious is the legal shift that takes
place once a craft crosses this boundary. Most notably, the where of the
craft changes because the principle of national sovereignty, a defining
feature of territorial air space law, is absent once a craft crosses the
airspace/outer space boundary. 7

4. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
5. Lara L. Manzione, Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space
Modelfor InternationalCooperation?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 507, 511 (2002).

6. Id.
7.

Freeland, supra note 1, at 7.
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Outer Space Treaty of 1967

The lack of national sovereignty in space results from a series of
multilateral treaties beginning with the Treaty on Principles governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("Outer Space Treaty") promulgated
in 1967 by The Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS"). s The treaty was signed
during a period when the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics ("U.S.S.R.") were attempting to outdo one another in outer space
achievements. 9 This so-called "Space Race" began in 1957 when the
Soviets successfully launched the first orbiting satellite, Sputnik. ° Soon
after Sputnik's launch, the Soviets achieved the first launch and return of a
human from space." l Driven by the Soviet Union's success, the United
States pushed ahead with 2Apollo 11 and, in 1969, became the first nation to
land a man on the Moon.'
The Outer Space Treaty was an attempt to alleviate the political
tensions resulting from the Space Race through a number of good-neighbor3
provisions and mutually agreed upon understandings between nations.1
The treaty espoused the key doctrine of all space law development for the
next forty years, the doctrine that no one nation had a greater claim to space
or celestial bodies greater than that of their neighbor-the doctrine of res
communis. 14 The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 effectively declared space
the province of all mankind and in doing so, implicitly rejected the res
nullius view of space as "unclaimed territory" available for conquest and
capture. 15 A res nullius approach of outer space would allow nations who
first reached celestial bodies to claim ownership to the exclusion of all
other nations.16 In contrast, the res communis approach would conceive of
outer space as a common resource, granting all nations open access while

8. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
9. Michael J. Listner, The Ownership and Exploitation of Outer Space: A Look at
FoundationalLaw and Future Legal Challenges to Current Claims, I REGENT J. INT'L L. 75, 75

(2003).
10. Id.
I1. See Manzione, supra note 5, at 513.
12. Id.
13. Id
14. Listner, supra note 9, at 77.
15.
16.

See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. I.
Listner, supra note 9, at 77.
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denying each exclusive possession.IV
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty articulated the principles of res
communis, stating that "the exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and
18
interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all mankind."'
Article II was especially significant, as it strengthened the commitment to
the res communis paradigm by stating that neither outer space nor celestial
objects including the Moon would be "subject to national appropriation by
claim of9 sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
1
means."

The deficiency of Article II is that if the notion was to foreclose the
appropriation of all celestial objects, the Article failed in that way to
adequately account for the actions of private actors. 20 Based on this
oversight, many private companies whose countries of origin are not
signatories to the Outer Space Treaty have asserted their res nullius claims
to celestial property.2 1 Indeed, by not expressly foreclosing private claims
of ownership, it remained at least theoretically possible for individuals to
assert celestial property rights.
But it is perhaps unfair that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty be cited too
harshly for this omission. The critique stems from a contemporary
understanding of transnational international relations in which nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations play a larger
role. Article II should be understood as a product of a time when only two
nations, the United States and the U.S.S.R., had demonstrated space-faring
capabilities. It is no small wonder then that Article II's primary focus
concerned state actors rather than state agents. A fairer evaluation of
Article II would posit that it failed to envision future forms of commercial
exploitation of space that were not based on national appropriation.
However, it is important to note that Article II did establish a practical
principle of national non-appropriation and, in this way, buttressed the res
communis principles of Article I by preserving the benefits of outer space
2
for more than just the United States and the U.S.S.R.
Article IV addressed the specific Cold War fear of nuclear weapons
being used from outer space by proscribing the placement of weapons of
mass destruction in orbit around the Earth and prohibiting the use of
17.

Id.

18.

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. I.

19. Id. at art. II.
20. See Listner, supra note 9, at 78.
21. Id.
22. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. II.
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celestial objects as military bases.2 3 Again, the efficacy of this treaty
provision became a victim of its time as it did not foresee or proscribe the
use of other kinds of "defensive" weaponry, such as President Ronald
Reagan's controversial anti-missile defense shield.24 In his Strategic
Defense Initiative, President Reagan requested a variety of weaponry
designed to intercept inbound nuclear warheads that were not expressly
forbidden by Article IV including space-based lasers, ground-based lasers,
X-ray lasers, particle weapons, and rail guns. 25 Though such weapons were
not envisioned at the time of drafting, it is certainly reasonable to critique
the drafters' lack of foresight when limiting Article IV's scope to weapons
of mass-destruction. Article V repeated Article Iv's attempt to alleviate
Cold War tensions by providing that member states render "all possible
assistance" to astronauts of other member states "in the event of accident,
distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on
the high seas."'6 Article V further provided for the safety of member
states' astronauts by stating that they "shall be 27safely and promptly returned
to the state of registry of their space vehicles.,
Article VI of the treaty made the signatory state liable for all the
"national" actions of its government and non-governmental agencies in
outer space.28 Article VI's text offered no detailed definitions for what
such "national" activities were presumed to be and mandated only that the
space activities of non-governmental entities "require authorization and
continuing supervision by the appropriate State party to the Treaty., 2 9
Article VII established a strict liability standard for states launching or
procuring the launching of objects into space. 30 Any damage caused by
their launch or activity in space or return to earth fell squarely upon the
launching state. 31 Article VIII also added that a launching state "shall
retain jurisdiction and control over such an object, and over any personnel
thereof, while in outer space, or on a celestial body" or upon its return to
Despite the lack of national sovereignty in space, Article VIII
Earth.
made clear that the terrestrial ownership of objects launched into outer

23. Id.at art. IV.
24. Listner, supra note 9, at 79.
25. Id.
26. Outer Space Treaty, supranote 8, at art. V.
27. Id.
28. Id. at art. VI.
29. Id.
30. Id. at art. VII.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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space remained unaffected by their activities while operating in space or
upon their return to the Earth.33

Taken together, Articles VI, VII, and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty
exist in a certain tension with Articles I, II, and IV. On the one hand, the
broad goal of the treaty is to prevent the assertion of national sovereignty
over celestial objects; yet, on the other hand, Earth objects launched into
space retain their ownership and are protected and regulated heavily by the
launching state. In this way, the treaty's text seems to proscribe one type
of celestial property right-namely the rights found in extraterrestrial
bodies-while otherwise protecting the activities and property of states
operating in outer space.
B.

Subsequent Treaties
Subsequent treaties to the Outer Space Treaty did much to expand
upon the idea of property rights found in its Articles VI, VII, and VIII. The
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space ("Rescue Agreement")
enlarged the Article V "rescue requirement" of the Outer Space Treaty by
mandating states to take all possible steps to rescue and assist astronauts in
distress and promptly return them to the launching state.34 The Rescue
Agreement also provided that states shall, upon request, provide assistance
to launching states in recovering space objects that return to Earth outside
the territory of the launching state.35
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects ("Convention") defined further the principles inherent in
Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty by detailing the nature and
extent of liability attendant upon a state for its actions in space.36 Article II
of the Convention held states absolutely liable for damage, even in cases of
force majeure, if the damage caused to the third state occurred "on the
surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight., 37 Article VI of the Convention
exonerated a launching state if that state could establish that "the damage
has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or from an act
or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant

33. Id. at art. Vill.
34. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Dec. 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.

35. Id
36. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29,
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
37. Id. at art. I].
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State or of natural or juridical persons it represents., 38 In the case of
39
damage caused in space, liability was apportioned according to fault.
When multiple states were liable for such damage, Article V of the
Convention held each state jointly and severally liable for the damage
resulting to the third state.4 ° Presumably, by tying levels of liability into
the geographic location of the harm, the Convention bridged the res
communis principle with national airspace principles that govern modem
aviation jurisprudence. 4'
In some ways, the logical outgrowth of the 1972 Liability Convention
was 1975's Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space ("Registration Convention") that required a launching state to
provide a national registration of space objects. 42 In addition, Article IV of
the Registration Convention mandated that each state provide the United
Nations with details about the object launched, including general function
and orbital parameters.43
The Outer Space Treaty and its three progeny were all signed and
ratified by the United States and what is today the Russian Federation. In
1979, however, the United States revealed the limits to which it was willing
to constrain its future space development by failing to sign and ratify the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies ("Moon Treaty"). 44 Embracing much of the same
language and provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty
extended the national non-appropriation principle enunciated in Article I of
the Outer Space Treaty by closing the perceived loophole, allowing for
private ownership of celestial bodies: "[N]either the surface nor the
subsurface of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place,
shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization, national organization or non-governmental
'
entity or of any natural person. 45
The Moon Treaty also prohibited claims
to lunar property through possession: "The placement of personnel, space
vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the

38.

Id. at art. VI.

39. Id. at art. III.
40. Id. at art. IV.
41. See Freeland, supranote 1, at 7.
42. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
43. Id. at art. IV.
44. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Dec. 5, 1979, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
45. Id. at art. XI.
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surface of the moon, including structures connected with its surface or
subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the
subsurface of the moon or any areas thereof., 46 Finally, the Moon Treaty
incorporated these provisions to include "other celestial bodies within the
solar system,, 47 excluding only "extraterrestrial
materials which reach the
48
surface of the earth by natural means.
Yet, even as the Moon Treaty purported to close the loophole allowing
private appropriation, its terms also represented a marked departure from
the non-appropriation principle contained within the Outer Space Treaty
and its progeny. The Moon Treaty does not fully proscribe nations or their
nationals from realizing any form of commercial value in extraterrestrial
objects.
Rather, the treaty encourages the "freedom of scientific
investigation" 49 and grants states "the right to collect on and remove from
the Moon samples of materials and other substances." 50 Such samples
remain at the disposal of the collecting state 5' and thereby assume certain
features of property, such as exclusive ownership and alienation.
Moreover, the treaty explicitly calls for an international regime "to govern
the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon" when such
exploitation proves feasible.
The stated purposes of the international
regime include "the orderly and safe development of the natural resources
of the Moon, 53 "[t]he rational management of those resources,''54 and
"[t]he expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources. ' 55
Presumably such language envisions uses of lunar natural resources in a
commercial manner. In reference to these provisions, the treaty may be
reviewed within five years and must be reviewed within ten.56
When compared to the Outer Space Treaty and its three progeny, it
may appear somewhat puzzling as to why the Moon Treaty failed to
receive the support of the United States and the U.S.S.R. While the Moon
Treaty expressly forecloses the ownership of celestial property to all
agents, it also grants states the right of use. Specifically, under the Moon
"

46. Id
47. Id. at art. I.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.at art. I.
Id.at art. VI.
Id.
Id.

52. Id. at art. XI.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Id.at art. XVIII.
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Treaty's terms, states can scientifically and commercially exploit the
natural resources found in celestial property. This "mining license" 57 is
significant because it effectively grants signatory states positive celestial
property rights within an international treaty structure that facially
disclaims such appropriative capacities.
One possible explanation as to why the Moon Treaty was never signed
by the United States may turn on the interrelatedness between the
government and the private sector in the history of space commerce. Since
the private sector was expressly proscribed from extraterrestrial ownership
under the Moon Treaty, signing the treaty would explicitly prohibit
governments from benefiting from their private industry counterparts.
II. Private Commercial Development
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 lists the
"[c]ommercial use of space" as the third purpose of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA").58 Specifically, the
section states, "Congress declares that the general welfare of the United
States requires that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (as
established by subchapter II of this chapter) seek and encourage, to the
maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space." 5 9 What
form did this and other government encouragement take?
A.

Space Commerce and Regulation

In the United States, the history of space commerce begins with the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962 ("CSA"), which originally
envisioned a global communications satellite network designed to promote
domestic and global communication.6 ° In an attempt to include private
communication carriers without turning over complete control of CSA's
governance structure to private industry, Congress created the
Communications Satellite Corporation ("ComSat"). 6' As one aspect of
striking that balance, ComSat was organized as a joint-venture with
corporate stock prorated between American and foreign carriers, aerospace
companies, equipment manufacturers, and the general public. 62 The

57.

Freeland, supra note 1, at 14.

58.
59.
60.

42 U.S.C. § 245 1(c) (2000).
Id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).

61. Harvey J. Levin, Organizationand Control of CommunicationsSatellites, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 315, 315-16 (1965).
62.

Id at316.
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objective of such an industrial structure was to merge the profit incentives
of private ownership with the wide diffusion of its benefits.63 The CSA
attempted such a broad distribution of benefits through imposing a highly
regulated system of controlling internal communications, assuring
equipment suppliers competitive access, broadly distributing corporation
stock, and providing service to unprofitable foreign markets when such
service was deemed to be in the national interest. 64
In this way, the CSA was notable because its regulatory structure
indicates that even at a time prior to the United States' ascendance into
space, future space utilization was conceived as a marriage between
government and private industry. While the activities of the latter would
maximize profit, government involvement and regulation ensured that the
benefits realized from space were protected and diffused as widely as
possible. This is the same logic that is applied to other industries, such as
telecommunications and public utilities, where the cost of entry into the
market (capital outlay, research and development, refining technical
expertise, etc.) is so steep as to effectively bar prospective market entrants.
Theoretically, government regulations are in place to counter the
oligopolistic proclivities of such markets while simultaneously ensuring
that industry actors realized reasonable gains from innovation and industry.
B. Deregulation and Consequences
However, it may be the case that such government regulations worked
too well when regulating the growing space commerce industry. In the
years that followed the CSA's passage, the development of domestic
commercial launch capabilities resulted in industry-wide pressure to revise
the complex regulatory scheme governing commercial launch.65 The
general flaw with many governmental regulatory schemes was that as space
commerce developed, the regulations that were intended to manage and
oversee the space-launch system overburdened prospective launchers by
mandating compliance with a multitude of onerous filing and licensing
requirements. Consequently, the legal requirements of launching an object
into space imposed a nearly impassable regulatory bureaucracy onto66 the
existent costs of developing, testing, and securing an object for launch.
The following example illustrates the problematic combined effect of
the government's launch service monopoly and its regulatory bureaucracy:
63.

Id.

64. Id.
65. Kim G. Yelton, Evolution, Organization and Implementation of the Commercial Space
Launch Act andAmendments ofl988,4 J.L. & TECH. 117, 119(1989).
66.

Id
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When Space Services Incorporated of America ("SSI") sought to launch
the first private commercial Expendable Launch Vehicle ("ELV"), known
as the Conestoga I, through the United States Space Transport System
("STS"), it had to contact every governmental agency that could
conceivably have jurisdiction over the launch.67 To satisfy its licensing
requirements, SSI had to petition the Department of State, Federal Aviation
Administration, Coast Guard, Bureaus for Materials and Motor Carriage
Safety, Federal Communications Commission, NASA, Department of
Defense, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, Navy, and Internal Revenue Service. 68 Each agency maintained
some conceivable control over a facet of the Conestoga I's launchthereby requiring not only notification, but time to study the launch plans,
deliberate, and negotiate permits and licenses with SSI. 6 9 Most tellingly,
after SSI had secured approval from the necessary agencies, the single most
expensive cost of its satellite launch was the cost SSI incurred to jump
through governmental regulatory hoops. 70 The effects of such a complex
regulatory bureaucracy were heightened by the lack of alternatives in
domestic launch services. Until 1982, the United States held a domestic
monopoly on launch services to space. 7' In that year, President Reagan
announced that the STS would continue to operate as the nation's primary
space-launch system for both national security and civil government
* 72
missions.
One effect of the announcement was to limit development of
alternate space-launch vehicle industries such as the ELV.73 Another effect
of the announcement was that it relegated private companies hoping for a
cheaper and streamlined launch process through ELVs back to the
nightmarishly bureaucratic STS launch system.
Over the next two years, growing industry frustration associated with
the STS system pressured President Reagan into issuing an executive order
on February 24, 1984, designating the Department of Transportation (DOT)
as the lead executive agency for facilitating commercial ELV operations
and coordinating the procurement of ELV launch licenses with other

67. Yelton, supra note 65, at 118. An ELV is a non-reusable rocket used to place a payload
into space that provides an alternative to STS launch operations.
68. Id. at 120-25.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 120.
71. Id at 117.
72. United States Space Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 872, 873 (July 4, 1982).
73. Yelton, supra note 65, at 118; see also Paul L. Brabant, Comment, The Regulation of
Commercial Space Launch Vehicles: A Revised Framework, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 113, 114 n.2
(1992).
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government agencies. 74 The newly streamlined process faced another
setback just two years later when the tragic loss of the Challenger Shuttle
on January 28, 1986 grounded the Shuttle fleet until 1988 and stymied the
direct government development of commercial space launch vehicles.75 In
1988, President Reagan laid out a "mixed fleet" approach that limited
commercial launches via the STS system to instances where the
commercial payloads required
launch via STS or for reasons of national
76
security and foreign policy.
The latest piece of congressional legislation regulating the commercial
space industry was the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) 77 that was
spurred on in part by the host of new technologies capable of commercially
exploiting space. 78 The CSLA streamlined the earlier space-launch
bureaucracy and mandated the DOT to issue licenses for all commercial
space launch programs, 79 regulate forms of space tourism 8 and space
advertising, 8' impose minimum liability insurance and financial
responsibility requirements, and 82 provide for administrative and judicial
review of DOT Secretariat decisions.83
Il.

A Legal System?

The CSLA represents the most recent and comprehensive United
States space commerce legislation; but, in the years since its passage, no
one has seriously questioned its consistency with United States
international obligations of "non-appropriation." The issue is especially
apt now, however, because the current and future capacities of
commercially exploiting space seem primed to challenge non-appropriation
as the guiding theme in space commerce. Therefore, the question we must
ask now is whether or not the United States is circumventing the intent of

74. See Exec. Order No. 12,465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7, 211 (Feb. 24, 1984).
75. Yelton, supra note 65, at 119.

76. Id.
77. 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101-70121 (2003).
78. R. Thomas Rankin, Note, Space Tourism: Fanny Packs, Ugly T-Shirts, and the Law in
Outer Space, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695, 705 (2003).
79. See 49 U.S.C. § 70104 (2003); id. § 70105 (2003) (detailing restrictions on launches and
license applications).
80. See 49 U.S.C § 70105; id. § 70105(a) (2003) (discussing provisions related to safety of
space tourists).
81. See49 U.S.C. § 70109(a)(2003).
82. See id§ 70112(2003).
83. See id. § 70110 (2003).
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non-appropriation by encouraging and protecting private commercial
expansion into space.
A.

Treaties Versus Congressional Acts

Whether the regulatory regime outlined in the CSLA conflicts with the
national non-appropriation principle, as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967 and in its succeeding treaties, is an issue that could be reviewed by
the federal judiciary under its constitutional grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction over cases "arising under" treaties.8 4 The judiciary's power to
interpret treaties is a power distinct from the treaty-making authority
delegated to the executive and legislative branches. Article II of the United
States Constitution authorizes the president to ratify treaties with the
consent of two-thirds membership of the Senate. 5 Treaties entered into in
this manner are the supreme law of the United States and bind state
constitutions, legislatures, and judiciaries.8 6
Generally, courts employ distinct methods of interpretation when
called on to perform the separate but related tasks of interpreting treaties
and resolving treaty-statutory disputes. As to the former, courts generally
will liberally construct a treaty "to give effect to the purpose which
animates it" and will prefer that liberal construction "[e]ven where a
provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting, the
other enlarging [of] rights which may be claimed under it."87 A preference
for broad construction, however, is not a license for courts to impose any
interpretation they deem appropriate. For example, although courts have a
greater ability to construct treaties more broadly than private contracts, they
are still precluded from interpreting a treaty beyond the "apparent intent
and purport" of its language.88 in this way, determining a treaty's "intent"
delineates the boundaries of how broadly or narrowly the court may
interpret a treaty's provision.
Courts obviously have a much easier time determining a treaty's intent
where the treaty language is unambiguous. In these instances, courts
expressly forbid looking beyond the language of the treaty to supply the
intent of the parties at the time the treaty was drawn.89 When the language

84. U.S. CONST.art. III, § 2, cl.1.
85. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
86. Id. at art. VI, § 2, cl.
2.
87. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989) (quoting Bacardi Corp. of America v.
Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940).
88.

The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 347 (1822).

89. See Maxinov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963); see also United States v. Texas
162 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1896).
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of the treaty is ambiguous, however, the court will attempt to effectuate the
drafter's intent through a broader inquiry into "the letter and spirit of the
instrument," and may take into account "considerations deducible from the
situation of the parties; and the reasonableness, justice, and nature of the
thing, for which provision has been made." 90 The United States Supreme
Court summarized its interpretive process in the case Eastern Airlines Inc.,
v. Floyd:
When interpreting a treaty, [begin] "with the text of the treaty and
the context in which the written words are used." 91 [When
confronted with difficult or ambiguous passages, the Court provided
that] [o]ther general rules of construction may be brought to bear[.]
[And it finally noted that] treaties are construed more liberally than
private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look
beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, 92
the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.
Treaty interpretation as described above is important when
determining whether the treaty conflicts with an act of Congress. Each
being the supreme law of the land, treaties and congressional acts are
governed by the last-in-time rule: when they conflict, courts must privilege
the last enacted treaty or congressional act over the other. 93 Still, federal
courts often avoid finding such conflicts between congressional acts and
treaty obligations. As Justice Marshall opined in 1804:
[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to
affect neutral commerce, further than
94 is warranted by the law of
nations as understood in this country.
Supreme Court jurisprudence since has largely followed the same
presumption and, therefore, courts are inclined to harmonize treaties and
95
congressional legislation that are seemingly antithetical to one another.
In the event that a congressional act were to supplant United States treaty
obligations, courts would look for unambiguous evidence appearing

90.

Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3. Dall.) 199, 249 (1796).

91. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991)
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988)).
92. Id. at 535 (quoting Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699).

(quoting Volkswagenwerk

93. J. Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315, 324 (1904).
94. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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"clearly and distinctly" in the text of the statute or treaty provision. 96 In
other words, repeals of prior statutes or treaty provision must likely be
made express.
In contrast, "repeals by implication" are generally
disfavored "unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and
explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole
subject, and, therefore, to displace the prior statute. 97
B.

CSLA Versus the Outer Space Treaty

Both being duly enacted, the CSLA and the Outer Space Treaty are
considered the supreme law of the land. If there is a conflict between the
United States space commerce provisions as outlined in the CSLA and the
Outer Space Treaty, a reviewing court would first be called upon to
interpret the intent of the treaty itself. Recall that in the context of treaty
interpretation, a court would be at liberty to give the treaty a broad
construction to effectuate its intent. The key provision of the Outer Space
Treaty at issue would be the language of Article II which forecloses
"national appropriation" of space by claims of sovereignty, means of use,
occupation, or any other means. 98
Black's Law Dictionary defines "appropriation" as "the exercise of
control over property, a taking of possession." 99 If defined broadly enough,
the joint enterprise nature of the United States space commerce, as
implemented in the CSLA, might violate the "spirit" of non-appropriation
as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The best argument one
could make against the CSLA's provisions is to advocate the court to
broadly interpret the "appropriation" principle of the Outer Space Treaty.
The proponent of this argument would urge that in so doing, a court should
look beyond the words of the treaty and examine the history, negotiations,
and practical considerations at the time of the treaty's negotiation to
determine its true intent. 100 One would also want to argue that the space
commerce industry violates perhaps not the "letter" of the treaty, but
circumvents entirely its "spirit" if a court were taking into account
"considerations deducible from the situation of the parties; and the
reasonableness, justice, and nature of the thing, for which provision has
been made."' 01
95. United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902).
96. Id.
97. Id.at 222 (quoting Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 58 (1895).
98. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. II.
99. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (8th ed. 2004).
100.

E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991).

101.

Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3. Dall.) 199, 249 (1796).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 36:3

One who attacked the CSLA's general legitimacy in this way could
argue that the United States is effectively "appropriating" space through its
protection and encouragement of private industry. Such an appropriation
would take place not by realizing a "sovereign" right to space property or
the uses of space as expressly proscribed in the Outer Space Treaty, but,
instead, through the effective use of government power, services, and
contracts to encourage and support the rapid development of the private
space commerce industry in the United States. In essence, the result of
such government encouragement might not amount to wholesale sovereign
appropriation, but, at the very least, a kind of sovereign and private space
activity that would cast doubt on whether the non-appropriation principle is
actually being respected. Therefore, one arguing that such activities were
tantamount to sovereign appropriation would highlight the interrelatedness
of government and private industry and argue for a broad interpretation of
"appropriation" that encompassed the practical effects of such a
relationship.
In addition to the regulatory interaction between the CSLA and private
space commerce industries, the interrelatedness between government and
private industry is clearly illustrated by the interaction between CSLA and
the 1972 Liability Convention. Recall that the Outer Space Treaty and its
progeny envision a "state-oriented" system of responsibility 10 2 where each
member state is responsible for all actions in outer space undertaken by the
state and its nationals. 10 3 The Liability Convention further binds member
states by holding each strictly liable for its actions or the actions of its
nationals within outer space and permits only member states to petition for
remuneration under the terms of the treaty. 104 In its text, the CSLA cites to
such international obligations,' 0 5 while also mitigating the United States'
liability under the Liability Convention. 0 6 The CSLA licensing program
ensures overall safety of private space ventures, 0 7 raises the funds
necessary to pay "potential treaty claims through its liability insurance

102. Freeland, supra note 1, at 16.
103. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. Vt.
104. See Liability Convention, supra note 36, at art. II.

105. 49 U.S.C. § 70101(a)(7) (2003) states,
[T]he United States should encourage private sector launches, reentries, and associated
services and, only to the extent necessary, regulate those launches, reentries, and
services to ensure compliance with international obligations of the United States and to
protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
106. Rankin, supra note 78, at 704-05.
107. Id. at 705.
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requirement,' 10 8 and limits the United States' joint and several liability
exposure through restricting private use of foreign launch and reentry
facilities.' 0 9 These provisions effectively allow the United States to pass on
the financial cost and recover from their private entities the amount of
damages for which they are internationally liable. 110 In this way, the
government is limiting its international liability exposure by passing on the
cost to the private sector.
When highlighting the further interrelatedness between government
and private industry, one could also note that the United States government
holds something of a monopoly in launch services and currently requires
that decisions regarding commercial space-launch must be approved
through the CSLA. 1 ' In addition, one making this argument would want to
highlight the highly interdependent nature of investment flowing from
government to private space commerce: in a February 4, 2008 press
release, NASA Deputy Administrator Shana Dale justified the agency's
2009 budget request of $17.6 billion by claiming that
"[t]he development of space simply cannot be 'all government all the
time[]' . . . . NASA's budget for [fiscal year] 2009 provides $173
million for entrepreneurs-from big companies or small ones-to
develop commercial transport capabilities. . . [and] NASA is
designating $500 million toward the development of this commercial
space capability." 2
In response to the arguments above, one arguing for the legitimacy of
the domestic space commerce industry would note that "appropriation," as
it appears in the Outer Space Treaty, should be interpreted narrowly.
Under this logic, one would contend that the highly interdependent nature
between government and industry is one in which the government has no
appropriation rights to space. Instead, the structure between government
and private space commerce does not exist to assist the United States in
"appropriating" space but instead serves to regulate private space
commerce. The argument would cite that government heavily regulates
private industry (through its monopoly of the STS launch system) and
through permitting legislation (such as the CSLA) and does not realize any
108. Id.

109. Id.
110.

Freeland, supra note 1, at 16.

111. See 49 U.S.C. § 70101-70121 (2003).
112. Press Release, David Mould and Michael Cabbage, NASA, NASA Unveils S 17.6 Billion
Budget (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.nasa.gov/homefhqnews/2008/feb/HQ_
08034_FY2009_budget.html.
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sovereign interest in outer space in the manner expressly proscribed by the
"non-appropriation principle." Moreover, one would argue that STS
launch contracts are in fact government contracts. Therefore, given that
"the Government acts in its commercial or propriety capacity in entering
contracts, rather than its sovereign capacity," '"1 3 the government cannot
appropriate space in a sovereign capacity merely through its regulation of
private commercial space-launch activities.
Faced with these conflicting interpretations, a court reviewing the
Outer Space Treaty could examine the history at the time of its signing for
clues as to what level of national involvement "appropriation" was
intended to cover. Recall that the Outer Space Treaty was signed during
the Space Race and was intended to alleviate tensions between space-faring
nations. 14 Construing the treaty's introductory text with the history of the
treaty's signing, the likely interpretation of the treaty is not a ban on the
commercial development of space but, rather, is a declaration of outer
space as a demilitarized zone that all nations were free to explore
peacefully and scientifically."I5 Under this view, the development of space
commerce would not be considered inherently contradictory to the
expressed treaty intent of peaceful and scientific space use.
On balance, although there may be some doubt as to whether the
United States space law regime is faithful to the spirit of non-appropriation,
it does not appear that there is a sufficient conflict between the treaty's
intent and the joint-enterprise structure of space commerce, as intimated
within the permitting structure of the CSLA, to warrant an express conflict
between the two. It is especially unlikely that a reviewing court, given its
interpretive preference for harmonizing treaty obligations with
congressional acts, would find a conflict in the absence of an express
conflict. Therefore, since the language of the CSLA does not expressly
conflict with the language of the Outer Space Treaty, it is highly likely that
courts would harmoniously interpret the two and legitimate the current and
existing joint-venture structure of domestic space commerce. Moreover,
even if there were an express conflict between the two, the CSLA would
trump the Outer Space Treaty provisions because it was the later enacted of
the two.

Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
114. See Manzione, supra note 5, at 513.
115. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8 (stating that it "[r]ecogni[zes] the common interest
of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes"
and "desir[es] to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the legal
aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.").
113.
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IV. Towards Appropriation
Even if the United States has found a way to circumvent the "spirit" of
its treaty obligations and reap the financial rewards of private space
industry, what does the future hold for the non-appropriation principle?
Given the existence of alternate space law structures and expanding options
for commercially exploiting space, might allowing for sovereign
appropriation prove a better alternative? If so, how would the United
States go about untangling itself from its treaty obligations? Part IV will
explore these questions in turn.
A.

Alternate Structures-The Emergence of Quasi-Property Rights

Even though national non-appropriation is the guiding theme of space
law, states have successfully implemented an alternate structure within the
context of geostationary orbital channels. An orbit roughly 22,400 miles
above the Earth that matches the Earth's 24-hour rotational circuit is called
a geostationary orbit ("GEO")." 6 Satellites situated in GEOs around the
equator appear to remain in a relatively fixed position at all times because7
the period of their orbits match the Earth's rotation around its own axis."
GEOs are especially preferable for telecommunications satellites as they
allow different points on the Earth to constantly communicate with one
another. 1 8 Therefore, it is no wonder that GEOs are tremendously
valuable to many private entities and national governments. 1 9
GEOs are a limited natural resource, restricted by the physical space a
satellite requires in orbit and by the need to properly coordinate GEOs so as
to avoid radio interference. 20 Currently, the International Telecommunicat
ion Union ("ITU"), a specialized agency of the United Nations, is
responsible for regulating the radio spectrum and allocating GEO slots to
states. 2' Spurred on by pressure from developing countries that a "firstcome, first-served" approach to GEO registry would deprive the
developing world of any chance to benefit from this limited natural
resource, the ITU's allotment 22plans were amended to guarantee all states
"equitable access" to registry.

116. Lynn M. Fountain, Note, CreatingMomentum in Space: Ending the ParalysisProduced
by the "Common Heritage ofMankind" Doctrine, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 1753, 1765 (2003).
117. Id.
118. Brabant, supra note 73, at 114 n.2.
119. See Fountain, supra note 116, at 1765.
120. Id.
121.
122.

Id.
Freeland, supra note 1, at 14.
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There are several implications of registering GEO slots. Most notable
is how the ITU registration of a nation's GEO manifests an express form of
sovereign rights over that orbital space. It is not difficult to see how such
registration directly challenges the international norm of national nonappropriation. Additionally, one may see how GEO registration could
potentially enrich certain nations already endowed with such orbits. In this
view, GEOs may then represent an alternate means to achieving the end
typically served by the non-appropriation principle: "the exploration and
use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries ...and shall be the province of all mankind." 123 Instead of
expressly forbidding states to appropriate space, the ITU acts as an
124
international trustee charged with equitably distributing GEOs.
However, due to the "first-come, first-served" method of allocating orbital
slots, developing states still suffer from a greatly inequitable distribution of
orbital slots.125 Indeed, this issue was brought to the forefront in the 1976
Bogota Declaration in which eight developing states petitioned for the
registry of GEOs directly over their territories, arguing that these orbital
slots were caused by terrestrial gravity and, thereby, a natural right of the
state.126 Though the petitioning states lost their case, 127 the lesson learned
may not implicate the failure of "appropriation" as a means of developing
space, but, rather, the danger of conjoining a national appropriation model
with a "first-come, first-served" method of allocation.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

B.

Why Appropriation?
Regardless of the dangers posed by such a "first-come, first-served"
method of allocating space rights, GEOs exemplify an alternative to the
national non-appropriation principle as defined in the Outer Space Treaty.
What might be the benefits of such a system, and why would such an
administrative international trusteeship be better than the current system of
non-appropriation? As other forms of space commerce expand, what
would be the benefit from withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty and
the subsequent treaties that followed?
Some commentators have pointed out that the national nonappropriation principle constitutes "an absolute barrier" in realizing

123. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. I.
124. See Fountain, supra note 116, at 1765.
125. Id.at 1766.
126. Jd.at 1766-67.
127.

Id. at 1767.
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commercial profits from all space activity.1 28 Such a prediction might
prove prophetic when considering the evidence of aggressive future
developments within the space commerce industry. A few current projects
in development indicate that the nature of space commerce is itself
susceptible to change by moving past modem-day industries such as
communication satellites and space tourism to other industries requiring a
much more permanent presence in space. To name just a handful of
projects currently in development for the near future, there are proposed
space hotels, orbital laboratories (providing zero-gravity biotech
manufacturing), solar satellites (with the potential to convert solar radiation
into usable electricity), space elevators (a cheaper form of space launch
than conventional rockets premised around raising an elevator car along a
cable extending 62,000 miles above Earth), and solar sails (collecting and
utilizing solar radiation instead of conventional rocket fuel to propel
spaceships and weather satellites). 129 Currently, these projects are being
developed by a host of both governmental and non-governmental agencies
with projected market sizes starting at $350 million.1 30 Consider also the
lucrative mining opportunity offered by 3554 Amun, a small M-class
(metal bearing) asteroid that will cross Earth's orbit in 2020 at a distance
In U.S. dollars, the asteroid contains,
closer than the Moon. 13
cobalt worth $6 trillion,
approximately, iron and nickel worth $8 trillion,
32
and platinum-like metals worth $6 trillion.1
In light of these slated projects, consider then the future of space
commerce and whether national non-appropriation makes sense. For
example, space tourism and space advertising will certainly require some
intellectual property protection of trademark in outer space. 133 An owner
who had devoted vast amounts of time, capital, and resources towards
developing a space hotel, laboratory, or space station, would likely want to
be afforded the highest degree of legal rights, including patent and

Freeland, supra note 1, at 12.
This
World,
of
are
Out
That
Opportunities
129. CNNMoney.cor,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/22/technology/business2-space outofthisworld/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2008).
130. Id. (Indeed, NASA's projected 2020 return to the Moon is expected to generate $104
billion in NASA contracts by 2018. By 2050, the market size for lunar helium mining is
estimated at $250 billion. By 2030, efforts to land humans on Mars are expected to generate for
the U.S. $400 billion in NASA contracts.).
131. Chris Taylor, Profits Set to Soar in Outer Space, BUSINESS 2.0 MAGAZINE, Feb. 27,
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/27/technology/business2 guidetospaceintro/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
128.

132.
133.

Id.
See Freeland, supra note 1, at 13.
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intellectual property rights. 34 Tangible property rights would also be
important to these owners. Presumably, owners would want to secure a
vested leasehold or the like in their property.1 35 The problem here is that
without the ability of a sovereign to claim the land, it is impossible for any
nation to assert jurisdiction over the property, whether to make or enforce
1 36
its laws, or to resolve simple questions as to title.
As these new commercial ventures emerge, it is likely that nonappropriation will have to be reconciled with the need to protect some
fundamental property rights to space commerce objects and ventures. One
option could be the creation of an international trusteeship, much like the
ITU, that would be charged to administer certain property rights and
resolve disputes. However, the other more immediate option available to
the United States would be to withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty
altogether and assert its sovereignty in space.
C.

Treaty Withdrawal

If the United States truly wanted to afford private space commerce the
utmost protection, it would withdraw from the treaties entirely. But treaty
withdrawal is itself an unclear constitutional issue. As discussed earlier,
one effective means of withdrawing from a treaty is for Congress to pass
subsequent legislation that is expressly inconsistent with the treaty
obligations. The concern here is that if such an act was not accurately
drafted, it would be subject to a presumption that Congress does not intend
to violate the law of nations and the principle that treaties and
congressional acts are subject to conciliatory judicial interpretation.
Perhaps the more expedient option available would require the United
States to withdraw altogether from the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny.
Though more direct than the former solution, treaty withdrawal implicates
an area of law that is less clear. This is because even though the
Constitution provides that the president can make a treaty and the Senate
can ratify it with a supermajority vote, 137 nowhere in the Constitution's text
does it articulate exactly how the United States may withdraw from treaty
obligations.
Without the Constitution to guide Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
Court has only addressed the issue once in the case of Goldwater v.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
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Carter.1 38 There, members of Congress led by Senator Barry Goldwater

initially filed for injunctive and declaratory relief against notice given by
President Jimmy Carter that he would unilaterally terminate the 1954
139
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan.
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the president could not unilaterally
withdraw from the treaty "without the advice and consent of the Senate or
the approval of both houses of Congress." 140 After the district court held
for the plaintiffs, the court of appeals reversed, citing that the president
abided by the termination clause in the treaty and, thereby, was permitted
to solely withdraw the United States from the treaty without the advice and
consent of the United States Senate.14' Had this theory proved persuasive
on appeal, the president would clearly possess the ability to terminate
United States space obligations under the termination clauses contained in
Outer Space Treaty and each of its progeny. Instead, the Supreme Court
remanded to the district court
vacated the court of appeals judgment and
4
with directions to dismiss the complaint.1 1
What the Supreme Court did not provide was a unified opinion of law
on whether the president could unilaterally withdraw the United States
from its treaty obligations. Though a majority of six justices ruled that the
case should be dismissed without hearing oral arguments, Justice White
and Justice Blackman would have heard oral arguments and given plenary
consideration, and Justice Brennan would have affirmed the ruling of the
court of appeals. 143 Within the majority, Justice Powell and Justice
Rehnquist proffered distinct reasons for dismissing the complaint.
Justice Powell wrote that the question was not ripe for judicial review
because Congress had not asserted its constitutional authority against the
president's unilateral termination of the treaty. 144 "The Judicial Branch,"
he wrote, "should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the president and Congress until the political branches reach a
To do otherwise, he concluded, would
constitutional impasse., 145
encourage "small groups or even individual Members of Congress" to seek

138.

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979).

139. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C. 1979).
140. Id.
141. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
142. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
143.
144.

Id. at 996-97.
Id. at 997.

145.

Id.
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judicial resolutions1 46before the political process had the opportunity to
resolve the conflict.

Where Justice Powell saw a role for the judiciary to intervene at a
specific time of inter-branch deadlock, Justice Rehnquist saw no role for
the judiciary in these types of conflicts. Justice Rehnquist found the
question before the Court was "political" and, therefore, nonjusticiable
because "it [involved] the authority of the President in the conduct of our
country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the
Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President."1 47 In Justice's
Rehnquist's view, the absence of a controlling constitutional provision
governing treaty withdrawal was significant: "In light of the absence of any
constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact
that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different
treaties ...

the instant case in my view also 'must surely be controlled by

political standards. -148
Generally, "[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." 149 However, in
Kucinich v. Bush, the D.C. Circuit determined that no such narrow
concurrence existed between Justice Powell's and Justice Rehnquist's
opinion.' 50 In the Kucinich case, thirty-two members of the House of
Representatives brought suit challenging President Bush's unilateral
withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ("ABM"). 5 ' The
court dismissed the case as a nonjusticiable political question, citing
Rehnquist's Goldwater opinion and its concern for respecting the authority
of the president to conduct the country's foreign relations. 152 In support of
its holding, the district court cited Made in the USA Foundation v. United
States, 53 an Eleventh Circuit decision where, in dismissing a treaty claim
for nonjusticiability, that court preferentially cited Justice Rehnquist's
opinion as "instructive and compelling."' 5 4 The D.C. District Court also
supported its dismissal for nonjusticiability by noting a similar holding in

146. Id.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1003.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14-15 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

151.

Id. at 2.

152.
153.

Id. at 15-16.
Made in U.S.A. Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11 th Cir. 2001).

154.

Bush, 236 F.Supp. at 15.
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another treaty interpretation case, Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan.
There the court found that a constitutional challenge to President Reagan's
unilateral termination-without congressional consent-of the Treaty of
with Nicaragua raised a
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
6
nonjusticiable political question. 1
While not having a unified Supreme Court precedent on the matter of
treaty withdrawal, it does appear that at least a few federal circuits have
affirmed that the executive may unilaterally extricate the United States
from its international treaty obligations without the advice and consent of
the Senate or Congress. In the space law context then, it seems possible
that the president could unilaterally withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty
and its progeny without transgressing his constitutional boundaries. If that
is the case, the pertinent question then becomes, what evidence do we have
of such an executive intent?
At the time of this writing it is unclear what objectives President
Barack H. Obama intends to accomplish within the space commerce
industry. The Bush Administration's rather assertive agenda for its future
space policy might presage the industry climate for future space
In the United States 2006 National Space Policy
development.
Announcement, the Bush administration framed American use of space as
essential to the United States' interests, explicitly rejecting assertions of
national sovereignty hostile to those of the United States and encouraging
Though the general hawkish tenor of the
private enterprise. 157
announcement surprised many commentators,]5 8 one passage might prove
prophetic for future United States space policy. In that passage, the
executive asserted that the United States would preserve
its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or
deter others from either impeding those rights or developing
capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect
its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary,
adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national
interests. 159

155. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, (D.Mass. 1986).
156. Id. at 1198-99.
157. See Press Release, United States Nat'l Space Policy (Oct. 6, 2006) (on file with the
Office of Sci. and Tech. Policy, Executive Office of the President).
158. See Marc Kaufman, Bush Sets Defense as Space Priority,WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2006, at
Al.
159. Id.
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Conclusion
On its face, the national non-appropriation principle outlined in the
Outer Space Treaty and its progeny would seem to hamstring the ability of
state or private actors to commercially develop space. Yet, since 2000,
worldwide government spending on space endeavors has reached
160
approximately $50 billion, indicating a 25 percent increase in spending.
In spite of this increase in investment, private industry has 16continued to
bankroll the vast majority of space investment in recent years. 1
If this trend continues on into the future, current international treaty
obligations will likely prove inadequate to address future space commerce
realities.
It may be the case that the United States has already
circumvented its international obligations to not appropriate space. But
even if the United States has maintained its treaty obligations until now,
future space commerce opportunities will almost inevitably demand
stronger assertions of national sovereignty to protect distinct forms of
property rights in space.
Asserting such national sovereignty could occur through the passage
of domestic legislation that is expressly inconsistent with United States
treaty obligations. The problem with this approach is that unless such
legislation is carefully and clearly drafted, it seems highly likely that the
judiciary would interpret such legislation as consistent with United States
treaty obligations. The more insidious problem with this approach is that it
may permit the United States to facially maintain its international treaty
obligations even while the government continues encouraging and working
with private industry to circumvent the spirit and goals of the Outer Space
Treaty and its progeny.
Recognizing that non-appropriation may not prove a desirable or
realistic theme to guide future space commerce, the United States should
consider withdrawing entirely from its international treaty obligations.
Although no clear constitutional mandate dictates which branch of
government is responsible for treaty withdrawal, it is likely that the
executive could withdraw the United States from its treaty obligations
without judicial reprisal. This approach would allow the United States to
continue to grant private businesses the greatest governmental protections
for their commercial ventures in space and, consequently, incentivize the
rapid development of various future space commerce activities.

160. John Adolph, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and the Necessity of an
InternationalFramework EmbracingPrivatePropertyRights To EncourageInvestment, 40 INT'L
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